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Poland’s Parliamentary Elections and a 
Looming Hungarian Scenario 
by Sławomir Sierakowski
Thanks to economic growth, Poland’s ruling PiS party has introduced social programs 
that have further bolstered its popularity. Unlike in recent European elections, the 
opposition is not running as a unified bloc in parliamentary elections on October 13, 2019. 
If PiS again wins a majority, it will take steps to cement its system of illiberal democracy. 
As long as he maintains good relations with Donald Trump, PiS’s leader Jaroslaw 
Kaczynski does not seem wary of reactions from Brussels and Berlin.
Four years of majority rule by the Law and Justice 
Party (PiS) in Poland have changed the paradigm of 
the country’s politics. Other Polish parties, media, and 
public opinion, have ceased to consider liberalism – both 
economic and political – as a given. Indeed, the liberal 
order is being implicated in the political dispute over 
people’s quality of life. Despite a strong economy, Poland’s 
previous liberal governments were unable to satisfy 
the population’s rising aspirations for the household 
budget. PiS took advantage of that circumstance and 
offered voters the largest social transfers in Polish 
history, together with a conservative nationalist vision of 
government, history, culture, and foreign policy. 
Thanks to favorable economic growth (4.6 percent in 
2017, 5.1 percent in 2018, and 4.4 percent as of the second 
quarter of this year), PiS has introduced a range of social 
programs that have bolstered the party’s popularity 
beyond the 37.8 percent it won in 2015. The ruling party 
has made sure that voters feel the positive effects of its 
promises at just the right moment. For example, PiS 
implemented its plan to pay out a thirteenth month of 
retirement benefits a week before the EU Parliamentary 
elections in May 2019, which were widely regarded as 
the opening act of the upcoming Polish parliamentary 
elections on October 13. It was – at least in part – thanks 
to its mobilization of retirees that PiS was able to beat its 
competition, winning 45.5 percent of the vote, compared 
to only 38.7 percent for the opposition united under the 
banner of the European Coalition. 
Poland's ruling party banks on child subsidy
In October’s upcoming parliamentary elections, voters 
will cast their ballots shortly after three months’ worth 
of child subsidies have been paid out – as of this year, the 
benefit of 500 złoty per month (roughly 114 euro) has 
been expanded to cover all children without exception. 
Moreover, PiS has just promised to raise the minimum 
salary from 2,250 złoty per month in 2019 to 3,000 złoty 
in 2020 and 4,000 złoty in 2023 (roughly 480, 685, and 
914 euro, respectively). It should be underlined that 
the government’s social programs impart not only a 
financial benefit, but above all bestow dignity, especially 
on residents of provincial areas. Such programs also 
demonstrate that the state can indeed have a tangible 
impact on citizens’ lives, which is why PiS enjoys such 
unshakeable support in villages and small towns. That 
support is enough for them to win countrywide elections, 
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even if the opposition still has the advantage in medium 
and large cities. 
Despite its wide-ranging social support programs, PiS 
has announced that, for the first time in Poland’s history, 
the government will adopt a deficit-free budget. The 
ruling party also announced that the lowest personal 
income tax rate will decrease from 18 percent to 17 
percent. Social transfers help maintain economic growth, 
at least in the short run, by increasing consumption, 
translating to about 0.5 percent economic growth. Higher 
consumption facilitates balancing the budget because it 
leads to higher tax revenues, primarily through the VAT.
The opposition is not running  
as a unified bloc
The proposals of the opposition pale in comparison to the 
government’s plans, especially since PiS has, in the eyes 
of many, achieved the status of a miracle worker. Given 
the low level of trust in institutions, the opposition’s 
overtures to improve public services or implement 
systemic reforms in areas such as healthcare or education 
are unable to compete with the government’s financial 
promises, even though such changes are deemed by 
voters to be of the highest importance. That is especially 
true now that, thanks to the child subsidy, parents can 
pay for private medical appointments or tutoring for their 
children. 
Unlike in the European elections this past May, the 
opposition is not running as a unified bloc in October’s 
parliamentary elections – despite the fact that Poland 
uses the D’Hondt method of counting votes, which 
rewards the largest parties at the expense of smaller 
ones when it comes to the distribution of parliamentary 
seats. The disintegration of the European Coalition was 
initiated by the Chrisitan-democratic Polish People’s 
Party (PSL), which determined that it was losing support 
in favor of PiS because of its alliance with the liberal-
conservative Civic Platform (PO) and the post-communist, 
social-democratic Democratic Left Alliance (SLD). 
Grzegorz Schetyna, the leader of PO, put the nail in the 
European Coalition’s coffin when he decided that a two-
party alliance with the SLD might prove unacceptable to 
PO voters. As a result, SLD decided to create a coalition of 
the Left, joining two other small left-wing parties, Robert 
Biedron’s Wiosna and Razem. Because the electoral 
threshold for party coalitions is 8 percent, however, all 
candidates are running as part of SLD, which, in turn, 
means that only SLD will receive state subsidies. After 
the election, Wiosna will most likely join with SLD, while 
Razem, which is even further to the Left, will probably 
establish its own parliamentary circle. 
Aggregated polling in September showed PiS with 
48 percent of voter support, PO with 28 percent, SLD 
with 12 percent, and PSL with 6.5 percent. The far-right 
Konfederacja may also win some seats; it currently 
stands at 4–5 percent in the polls. Konfederacja is also a 
potential coalition partner for PiS. If it does well, but not 
well enough to enter the Sejm, the d’Hondt rules dictate 
that the majority of votes cast for Konfederacja will go 
to PiS. Winning as little as 43 percent of the vote could 
give PiS a majority. If it falls a few seats short, the current 
ruling party may simply try to bribe support from several 
members of PSL, which is considered the most fickle and 
opportunistic party.
PiS has so far proven remarkably immune to 
scandal. Contrary to expectations and unlike in the 
past, numerous scandals, which have revealed PiS’s 
shortcomings to voters, have not undermined support 
for the ruling party. On the one hand, the traditional 
PiS electorate remains unmoved by them. On the other, 
voters who started supporting the party more recently 
find that PiS’s implementation of its social promises gives 
them little choice but to continue – despite the fact that 
nepotism, corruption, the reduction of public media to 
instruments of propaganda, and international isolation 
may be problematic. This is especially true in light of the 
fact that the liberal-conservative PO party is largely seen 
very negatively, even among its own supporters. And, as 
long as PiS satisfies voters’ material expectations, the new 
coalition of the Left will be hampered because it lacks 
support in rural areas. Only 8 percent of voters can be 
described as hardline supporters of the Left, while at most 
a further 12 percent might be won over.
The opposition is putting forward a unified electoral 
list for the Senate, where all 100 senators are elected 
in single-mandate districts. An opposition majority is 
more likely in the Senate than in the Sejm. Winning the 
Senate would at least give the opposition some options 
to delay the dismantling of liberal democracy. Poland’s 
constitution, for example, cannot be amended without 
the Senate’s consent. The Senate also has influence when 
it comes to certain appointments. 
PiS plans to “re-polonize” media
If PiS wins a majority, the party will try to cement its 
system of illiberal democracy. The main obstacle to 
realizing that goal remains Poland’s private media. The 
country’s most significant private television network, 
TVN and TVN24, is owned by the American company 
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Discovery, Inc., while Onet.pl, the largest internet portal, 
is owned by the Swiss-German Ringier Axel Springer 
Media AG, which also owns the largest tabloid Fakt and 
the popular weekly Newsweek Polska. Without taking 
over these media outlets, PiS cannot feel as secure in 
its power because of the possibility of, for instance, an 
economic downturn with consequent press coverage 
of a loss of faith in the government. The former PiS 
politician Pawel Kowal (the originator of the expanded 
child subsidy), who is currently running from the 
Citizens’ Coalition list in Krakow, believes that, if the 
current ruling party wins a 240–250-seat majority, it 
will try to convince American politicians to turn a blind 
eye and push Discovery to sell TVN and TVN24 to one 
of the larger state-owned companies. Unlike in Hungary, 
Poland’s ruling party cannot simply acquire unfriendly 
media through its oligarchs because it has none – 
meaning that PiS would have to resort to a state-owned 
bank or insurance company for help.
A confrontation with Berlin is more likely 
than one with Washington
It is much more likely that what the ruling party terms the 
“re-Polonization” of the media would take place through 
anti-monopoly legislation that would restrict the portion 
of the media market that one company could control. 
In that case, regional media outlets owned by German 
companies would be most at risk. The German media 
concern Verlagsgruppe Passau, for example, controls 
almost half of Poland’s regional newspaper market.
Because of mostly economic interdependencies, 
Germany is the second country – after the United States 
– that PiS takes seriously. A confrontation with Berlin 
is more likely than one with Washington, however. An 
attempt by the government to take over more control of 
regional media from Germany seems almost guaranteed. 
Other likely developments include an attempt “to 
complete the reform” of Poland’s Supreme Court, from 
which PiS partially backed away as a result of pressure 
from the European Court of Justice, as well as the 
subjugation of cultural institutions, which are largely 
hostile to PiS. 
Most of the funds paid to Poland by the European 
Union are controlled by the country’s regional 
governments. They currently have significant 
competences and run schools and cultural institutions. 
The opposition still rules in seven out of sixteen of 
Poland’s regional governments, as well as almost all large 
and medium cities. PiS has already started to limit these 
competences and funds. If it wins the parliamentary 
elections, PiS will try to go much further. 
PiS may hold off on such actions, however, until after 
the next presidential election, which is slated for spring 
2020. Andrzej Duda’s reelection seems likely. While 
Donald Tusk is set to announce whether he will run in 
December 2019, opinion polls currently show that he 
would lose to the current president. Moreover, many 
voters hold a grudge against Tusk because he raised 
the retirement age to 67 – a decision reversed by PiS. 
Nevertheless, Tusk is an able politician and may increase 
his support over the course of a campaign. Still, it 
remains unclear whether Tusk will be nominated by his 
own party, which is currently led by his rival, Grzegorz 
Schetyna.
The EU is barely at issue in the  
electoral campaign
In terms of foreign policy, it seems clear that PiS does 
not fear confrontation with Brussels. The Polish ruling 
party understands the EU’s weaknesses when it comes to 
decision-making. Any attempt to suspend Poland’s voting 
rights under Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union 
would be vetoed by Hungary. The rule of conditionality – 
making payment of EU funds dependent on maintaining 
the rule of law – has not yet been implemented, and it 
is unclear whether it ever will be. Having observed the 
EU’s inability to defend the rules of liberal democracy as 
defined by the Copenhagen Criteria of 1993, which apply 
to all member states, the Polish government most likely 
assumes that Brussels will continue to be ineffective in 
this regard, especially in light of the attention it needs to 
pay to Brexit and a possible trade war with the US. 
Relations between the Polish government and the 
European Commission or the European Parliament 
are not at issue in the campaign. Even the opposition 
has ceased raising questions related to them because 
voters do not find them compelling, even though Poles 
overwhelmingly support European integration. Polish 
voters simply do not believe that Poland faces any real 
threat from Brussels. The majority of voters generally 
oppose any outside interference in Polish politics. The 
opposition does not support the EU’s rule of conditionality, 
meaning it is in line with the government on this issue. 
For PiS voters, relations with the United States are 
particularly important, and that bilateral relationship 
seems to be going very well under Donald Trump’s 
administration, meaning that the current cooling of 
Poland’s relations with Brussels and Berlin do not 
undermine its sense of security. 
Poland’s Parliamentary Elections and a Looming Hungarian Scenario   3
DGAPstandpunkt  / Nr. 28 / October 2019
Jaroslaw Kaczynski is on a straight path to assuring 
his party’s parliamentary majority, which will enable 
him make the PiS’s “Budapest in Warsaw” plan a reality. 
Poles have clearly shown that, after three decades of 
transition based on the neoliberal reforms that became 
known as “shock therapy,” they expect concrete benefits 
from a welfare state. What is more, they will accept a 
welfare state that provides them these benefits whether it 
is part of a liberal or illiberal order – something that still 
seems to come as a surprise to the majority of Poland’s 
opposition and media. Consequently, what Poles are 
going through as their country becomes more illiberal 
and a Hungarian scenario looms can be seen as shock 
therapy in the opposite direction, especially for Polish 
elites. 
Sławomir Sierakowski is Senior Fellow at the Alfred von 
Oppenheim Center for European Policy Studies
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